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Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights: Visibility, Agency and Enforceability 
Conor O’Mahony* 
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ABSTRACT 
While almost every state in the world has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), there is less consensus around the manner in which the rights protected by the CRC should be 
protected in national constitutions. To say that a constitution makes provision for children’s rights is 
just a starting point: the extent to which a national constitution takes a genuine child rights 
approach will depend on the quality of the constitutional provisions in question. This paper aims to 
provide a typology which can be used to assess whether the approach taken by any given 
constitution to the protection of children’s rights is in line with the child rights approach envisaged 
by CRC by analysing individual constitutions along three separate spectrums. The Visibility spectrum 
measures how visible children are in a constitutional scheme; the Agency spectrum measures the 
extent to which children are considered to be independent, autonomous rights holders, while the 
Enforceability spectrum measures the extent to which children’s constitutional rights can be 
enforced. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
While almost every state in the world has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC),1 there is wide divergence evident in the extent and manner of protection in national 
constitutions for the rights provided for in the CRC. As the fundamental source of law in a legal 
system, the presence of children’s rights provisions in a national constitution has the potential to be 
highly significant. In Europe, there is broad consensus that constitutions should make at least some 
reference to children in their provisions on fundamental rights. 46 of the 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe have codified written constitutions; of these, 45 include provisions that make 
express reference to children. However, to say that a constitution makes reference to children is just 
a starting point; not all such provisions create rights for children, and even among those that do, 
there are many different approaches taken to their drafting and enforceability. The extent to which 
a national constitution takes a genuine child rights approach will depend on the quality of the 
constitutional provisions in question, and any attempt to benchmark a particular constitutional 
scheme against the CRC requires detailed analysis. 
This paper aims to provide a typology which can be used to assess whether the approach 
taken by any given constitution to the protection of children’s rights is in line with the child rights 
approach envisaged by the CRC. It does not aim to assess the actual level of protection provided on 
the ground in the states analysed for specific rights itemised in the CRC, which would be far outside 
the scope of a single article. Instead, it allows for existing constitutional schemes or draft 
constitutional amendments to be analysed with a view to assessing whether they take a genuine 
 
* conor.omahony@ucc.ie  
1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. 
2 
 
child rights approach. It also provides more in-depth analysis than previous literature2 in this area by 
focusing on a regional subset of states (namely, member states of the Council of Europe) rather than 
conducting a global survey, and provides more nuance by analysing individual constitutions along 
three separate spectrums rather than assigning constitutions as a whole (or aspects of children’s 
rights protection within constitutions) to rigid categories. The Visibility spectrum measures how 
visible children are in a constitutional scheme and the range of children’s rights that are expressly 
protected. The Agency spectrum measures the extent to which children are considered to be 
independent, autonomous rights holders rather than objects of concern who are in need of 
protection. Finally, the Enforceability spectrum measures the extent to which children’s 
constitutional rights can be enforced through a variety of possible remedial avenues. It will be seen 
that a constitution can score highly on one spectrum but poorly on another; this paper argues that 
all three spectrums are at the core of the child rights approach evident in the text of the CRC and the 
jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘the CRC Committee’), and a constitution 
that scores highly on all three will achieve the greatest level of harmony with this approach. 
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: A SPECTRUM APPROACH 
As is well known, the CRC is the key international instrument on children’s rights and represents an 
extraordinary level of international consensus on the legal rights that children should have. The 
Convention imposes obligations on 195 states parties to provide legal protection for a wide range of 
rights that inhere in children by virtue of their human dignity.3 Many of these rights inhere in all 
human beings, and were therefore already protected by pre-existing instruments of international 
law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The CRC aims to emphasise that these 
rights apply equally to children, regardless of their age, and to provide explicit measures to ensure 
that children can enjoy these rights on an equal basis with other human beings.4 The Convention 
grants rights to children across categories often referred to as the three Ps: Protection (from harm, 
violence or exploitation); Provision (with the resources or services necessary for a decent life); and 
Participation (in society and in decisions affecting the child).5 
In addition, the Convention makes specific provision for some rights that are particular to 
children due to their stage of development and their comparatively disempowered position in 
society. It seems clear that some of the rights protected in the CRC are either not relevant, or less 
relevant, to adults with full legal capacity, and thus do not tend to feature in the general human 
rights conventions. These include the best interests principle in Article 3; the right to special 
 
2 There have been two main studies previously published in this area: Tobin, ‘Increasingly seen and heard: the 
constitutional recognition of children’s rights’, (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 86 and 
Habashi et al., ‘Constitutional Analysis: A Proclamation of Children's Right to Protection, Provision, and 
Participation’, (2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 267. 
3 Verhellen, ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Reflections from a historical, social policy and 
educational perspective’, in Vanderhole (ed), Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies 
(2015) at 43. 
4 Ibid. at 48. See also Lopatka, ‘Introduction’ in Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(2007) at xxxvii, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/LegislativeHistorycrc1en.pdf. For 
a sceptical view of the strategy of providing children with ‘special rights’ rather than relying on general rights 
guarantees, see Dwyer, ‘Inter-Country Adoption and the Special Rights Fallacy’, (2013) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 189 at 198-208. 
5 For a discussion of the three Ps and how they interact with the four general principles of the CRC, see 
Verhellen, supra n 3 at 49-50. 
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protection and assistance for children deprived of their family environment in Article 20; the right to 
development under Article 6; and a range of rights in Articles 7-12, including the right to name and 
nationality, preservation of identity, the right to maintain contact with parents, and the right to 
express views in all matters affecting the child. In this way, the CRC does not just re-state that 
children enjoy the same rights as adults, but supplements the rights afforded to adults with 
important child-specific rights. Cutting across the CRC as a whole are four general principles that 
have been identified by the CRC Committee: the right to life, survival and development (Article 6); 
non-discrimination (Article 2); that the best interests of children should a primary consideration in all 
matters affecting them (Article 3); and the right of children to participate in decision affecting them 
(Article 12).6 
This article does not propose to benchmark national constitutions against all the individual 
rights contained in the CRC (clearly, an impossible task in a work of this length); instead, its focus is 
on the overall approach taken by national constitutions to the protection of children’s rights, and the 
extent to which that approach is in harmony with what Verhellen has termed the ‘holistic childhood 
image in the CRC’.7 This is encapsulated both in the text of the CRC itself and in the jurisprudence of 
the CRC Committee (which highlighted in General Comment No. 5 the importance of taking a holistic 
approach to assessing compliance).8 Crucially for these purposes, the CRC Committee has set out 
what it describes as a child rights approach, defined in General Comment No. 13 as: 
A child rights approach is one which furthers the realization of the rights of all children as set 
out in the Convention by developing the capacity of duty bearers to meet their obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil rights (art. 4) and the capacity of rights holders to claim their 
rights, guided at all times by the rights to non-discrimination (art. 2), consideration of the 
best interests of the child (art. 3, para. 1), life, survival and development (art. 6), and respect 
for the views of the child (art. 12). Children also have the right to be directed and guided in 
the exercise of their rights by caregivers, parents and community members, in line with 
children’s evolving capacities (art. 5). This child rights approach is holistic and places 
emphasis on supporting the strengths and resources of the child him/herself and all social 
systems of which the child is a part: family, school, community, institutions, religious and 
cultural systems. 9 
Moreover, the Committee has stressed in General Comment No. 5 that it is not enough for 
the law to say that children have rights along the lines set out above: it must give meaning to those 
rights by providing a means for their enforcement: 
For rights to have meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations. This 
requirement is implicit in the Convention and consistently referred to in the other six major 
international human rights treaties. Children’s special and dependent status creates real 
difficulties for them in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights. So States need to give 
particular attention to ensuring that there are effective, child-sensitive procedures available 
to children and their representatives.10 
 
6 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003): General measures of implementation 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 27 November 2003 at para 12. 
7 Verhellen, supra n 3 at 50. 
8 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 6 at para 18. 
9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: Article 19: the right of the child to freedom 
from all forms of violence, 18 April 2011 at para 59. 
10 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 6 at para 24. 
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Rather than taking an atomised approach of focusing on individual provisions, the analysis 
will hold the stance taken by national constitutions towards children and children’s rights up against 
the child rights approach envisaged by the text of the CRC and the jurisprudence of the CRC 
Committee. This holistic approach provides a more effective overall assessment of the relationship 
between a national constitution and children’s rights than an analysis focused on the level of 
protection provided by specific rights in a national constitution. A national constitution that takes a 
stance that conflicts with the CRC child rights approach (by treating children as invisible, or as mere 
objects in need of protection, or has having rights that are unenforceable) risks setting a tone for a 
legal system as a whole that undermines laws protecting children’s rights and hinders the effective 
implementation of the CRC in that state. Conversely, a national constitution that portrays children’s 
rights in a manner that coheres with the CRC and the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee has the 
potential to act as an important aid to compliance with the Convention. 
From an implementation perspective, the Convention is focused broadly on law and policy, 
and constitutional law is not singled out for special attention. Article 4 of the CRC requires that 
states parties ‘undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.’ While full implementation of 
Convention rights is a legally binding obligation, states parties are left a degree of discretion as to 
how they go about achieving this.11 The Committee has stressed that ‘[e]nsuring that all domestic 
legislation is fully compatible with the Convention and that the Convention’s principles and 
provisions can be directly applied and appropriately enforced is fundamental.’12 However, the 
Convention does not require states parties to elevate children’s rights to constitutional status; if 
domestic law as a whole is compatible with a state’s obligations under the CRC, the absence of 
constitutional protection for children’s rights would not cause that state to fall short of its 
obligations. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the CRC Committee has stated that it welcomes constitutional 
protection on the basis that it ‘helps to underline the key message of the Convention – that children 
alongside adults are holders of human rights.’13 The point is that adults have constitutional rights; 
and if children are to be viewed as autonomous rights holders in the manner intended by the CRC, 
then it makes sense that constitutions that make provision for the rights of adults should also make 
provision for the rights of children. It will be seen below that some level of specific protection for 
children’s rights is almost invariably included in national constitutions of Council of Europe states, 
although the form that this protection takes varies widely. 
Assessing the extent to which national constitutional law takes a child rights approach that is 
in harmony with the CRC requires detailed analysis, and comparisons between states are rendered 
difficult by the wide variation of approaches. Two previous studies have approached this task. John 
Tobin14 has tracked the transformative effect of international human rights law on national 
constitutions, and identified three main periods in the development of children's rights. The pre-
World War II period was characterised by an absence of focus on children in international human 
 
11 Ibid. at para 26: ‘The Committee cannot prescribe in detail the measures which each or every State party will 
find appropriate to ensure effective implementation of the Convention.’ 
12 Ibid. at para 1. 
13 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 6 at para 21. 
14 Tobin, supra n 2. 
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rights law (and other sources of international law),15 and by ‘invisible child’ constitutions which 
made no specific provision for the rights of children. The post-World War II period saw international 
human rights law begin to adopt ‘special protection’ provisions characterising children as objects in 
need of the special protection of the law, and Tobin argued that this was reflected in national 
constitutions of that era. Finally, the period following the enactment of the CRC in 1989 saw an 
increasing focus on children as autonomous rights holders and the advent of what Tobin called the 
‘children’s rights constitution’. Since most constitutions in the Council of Europe are post-war 
constitutions, it will be seen that constitutions that make no specific provision for the rights of 
children do not really feature in this region. The influence of the CRC is evident in the detailed 
provisions included in various post-1989 constitutions, as well as in recent amendments to several 
older constitutions. 
Tobin highlighted the fact that even where constitutions do provide specific protection for 
children’s rights, the form that this protection takes varies widely. Thus, the extent to which a 
particular constitutional scheme will be in line with the requirements of the CRC requires 
considerable analysis to determine. However, while Tobin’s study is invaluable in framing the 
discussion and providing multiple examples of approaches to constitutionalisation, his typology is 
not well suited to acting as a lens through which to determine the extent to which a particular 
constitutional scheme is in harmony with the child rights approach envisaged by the CRC and the 
jurisprudence of the CRC Committee. First, it does not account for constitutions that do not fit neatly 
into one of the three categories outlined above. (Tobin acknowledged that this may be the case, 
particularly at the boundary between the ‘special protection constitution’ and the ‘children’s rights 
constitution’.16) It will be seen below that relatively few constitutions can be neatly pigeon-holed as 
one or the other. Second, the enforceability of children’s constitutional rights formed quite a brief 
part of the overall analysis, and there was no consideration of the variety of enforcement 
mechanisms available and of their comparative effectiveness.17 
An alternative typology features in a study by Janette Habashi et al.,18 who employed a 
complicated empirical approach whereby a linguistic content analysis was conducted of relevant 
constitutional provisions across the globe, which were then benchmarked against Human 
Development Index development indicators under the rubric of the three Ps mentioned earlier (i.e. 
Protection, Provision and Participation). This was a hugely ambitious undertaking which generated 
interesting findings about the correlation between the protection enjoyed by children’s rights in a 
country’s constitution and the state of development of that country. It probably took on more than 
could be examined in detail in an article-length analysis, and – unlike Tobin – included relatively little 
engagement with the actual text of constitutions. Where it improved upon Tobin’s approach was in 
the use of multiple indicators to examine each country’s constitution instead of employing a 
typology that only allowed any given constitution to belong to a single category. Like Tobin, 
however, the key issue of enforcement of rights was not examined in any detail. The significance of 
this omission will be highlighted below. 
 
15 International Humanitarian Law also made provision for the special protection of children during this period; 
see, e.g., Articles 14, 24, 38.5, 50, 51, 82, 89, 94 and 132 of Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). 
16 Tobin, supra n 2 at 111, where he acknowledges that the ‘extent to which states make the transition from a 
special protection or welfare based approach to a rights based approach varies’, and gives the example of the 
Article 54 of the Albanian Constitution, which he says ‘tends to straddle both classifications’. 
17 Ibid. at 118-120. 
18 Habashi et al., supra n 2. 
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This paper proposes a new typology that draws on the best elements of these previous 
studies, while also doing some things differently. While Habashi et al.’s approach of examining each 
constitution under multiple headings avoided some of the rigidity of Tobin’s tendency to pigeon-hole 
entire constitutions into single categories, their use of the three Ps suffered from the limitation that 
it only considered which categories of rights a constitution contains; it did not tell us anything about 
the quality of the provisions or the enforceability of them. Constitutions were simply identified as 
containing rights associated with protection, provision or participation, with no comment made 
about which rights are included under each heading or how strongly protected they are. Tobin’s 
typology lends itself more effectively to making a qualitative judgment, with the ‘invisible child 
constitution’ scoring lowest and the ‘children’s rights constitution’ scoring highest. 
With a view to furthering this analysis, this paper employs a three-part typology of Visibility, 
Agency and Enforceability, and adopts a spectrum approach to analysis under these headings. 
Assessing constitutions against three headings allows individual constitutions to be assessed by 
reference to a variety of key measures at once, thus capturing multiple aspects of the quality of 
protection; while the spectrum approach accounts for both subtle differences in the quality of 
protection under each spectrums as well as stark ones. The spectrums chosen aim to build on the 
work conducted by Tobin and Habashi et al., drawing on the strengths of their work identified 
above, while addressing the limitations associated with the rigidity of their categorisations and the 
absence of any assessment of the enforceability of constitutional provisions. The first spectrum, 
discussed in Part 3 below, is Visibility: how visible are children in a national constitution? This may 
range from completely invisible to highly visible. In between these two extremes are a number of 
constitutions which protect only a single right of children (the right to education), while others 
protect a right to education plus a discrete number of other commonly-protected children’s rights. 
The visibility of children in constitutional law matters, and making children visible requires 
child-specific provisions rather than leaving children to rely on general rights guarantees. Tobin 
correctly identifies the historical progression from the ‘invisible child constitution’, to the ‘special 
protection constitution’, to the ‘children’s rights constitution’ as key points of progress in the 
advancement of children’s rights. It was noted above that Tobin argues that constitutional 
protection helps to legitimate political discourse about children’s rights,19 while Habashi et al. go 
further by arguing that providing constitutional protection for children’s rights makes them part of 
the ‘national soul’.20 Indeed, there is a substantial body of literature on the expressive dimension of 
written constitutions and their ‘unique symbolic power (among laws at least) to express a polity’s 
core commitments.’21 This focuses attention on children’s rights and can serve as a nexus for 
advocacy and political activism,22 generating significant potential to contribute to the development 
of what the CRC Committee describes as a ‘children’s rights perspective throughout Government, 
 
19 Tobin, supra n 2 at 126. 
20 Habashi et al., supra n 2 at 279-283 (citing Heine, ‘Institutional Engineering in New Democracies’, in Van 
Beek (ed), Democracy Under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents (2005) at 65-94). 
21 Lino, ‘Written Constitutions and the Politics of Recognition: Symbolism and Substance’ at 4, 22 July 2014, 
available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470177  [last accessed 8 April 2019]. See further, e.g., Sunstein, ‘On 
the Expressive Function of Law’, (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021 at 2027-8 (‘A society 
might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on those norms via law, even if the consequences 
of the insistence are obscure or unknown’) and King, ‘Constitutions as Mission Statements’, in Galligan and 
Versteeg (eds), Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (2013) at 73. 
22 Freeman, ‘Why it remains important to take children’s rights seriously’, (2007) 15 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 5 at 8. 
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parliament and the judiciary [which] is required for effective implementation of the whole 
Convention.23 
However, the extent to which this will hold true depends at least in part on just how visible 
those rights are. Even a passing reference to children would be sufficient to move a constitution out 
of Tobin’s ‘invisible child constitution’ category, even though such a constitution is much closer to 
the ‘invisible child constitution’ than it is to the ‘children’s rights constitution’. In simple terms, the 
more visible children’s rights are in a constitution, the wider the range of children’s rights that will 
enjoy the benefits of constitutional status, including entrenchment,24 supremacy25 and acting as a 
counterbalance to constitutionally-protected rights of parents and families, which otherwise run the 
risk of being asserted in ways that are detrimental to children.26 Thus, rather than a black-and-white 
statement of whether children either are or are not visible in a constitution, analysing constitutions 
along a spectrum of visibility allows for a more nuanced assessment of the potential of a particular 
constitutional scheme to place children’s rights at the heart of law and policy, in line with the child 
rights approach envisaged by the CRC. 
The second spectrum, discussed in Part 4 below, is Agency, and assesses whether a 
constitution is closer to what Tobin calls the ‘special protection constitution’ at one end of the 
spectrum or the ‘children’s rights constitution’ at the other. This spectrum measures the extent to 
which a constitution has made what the CRC Committee describes as the ‘paradigm shift away from 
child protection approaches in which children are perceived and treated as “objects” in need of 
assistance rather than as rights holders’27 by placing constitutions on a spectrum ranging from those 
displaying a paternalistic attitude at one end, to those displaying a child-centred attitude at the 
other. Agency is a crucial indicator of the quality of children’s rights provisions. When adopted in 
1989, the CRC aimed to establish children as independent, autonomous rights-holders, and ‘can be 
seen as the historic culmination point of a long struggle for recognition of children as fully-fledged 
human beings – as subjects of rights’.28 Eugeen Verhellen argues that ‘[t]he main aim of … the 
‘Children’s Rights Movement’, was to have children considered as fully-fledged citizens … with their 
 
23 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 6 at para 12. 
24 Habashi et al., supra n 2 at 279: ‘One could argue that nation-states have laws and policies to ensure 
protection and provision for children without including such in the constitution. This argument is not sufficient 
because economic crisis, war and upheaval might break down or limit entirely the imperative services that only 
the constitution and associated amendments could safeguard …’ 
25 For discussion of the advantages of elevating children’s rights to the highest level in a legal system, see, e.g., 
O’Mahony, ‘Constitutionalism and Legislation in Special Educational Needs Law: An Anglo-Irish Comparison’, 
(2008) Public Law 125 and Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse, ‘A Maturing Manifesto: The Constitutionalisation of 
Children’s Rights in South African Jurisprudence 2007-2012’, (2013) 21 International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 646 at 677, where they state: ‘It can be concluded that in a certain sense, children’s rights have come 
up trumps: this is not to say that right need not be ‘balanced’ when there is conflict, nor that rights are not 
subject to limitation. However, the rights of children cannot be overlooked, rendered perfunctory or written 
out of the script – no matter what the context … In addition, officials, drawn from a wide pool, are duty bound 
to consider children’s interests before acting … the impact of constitutionalisation of children’s rights has 
grown exponentially to infuse a dynamic and expanding field of judicial activity.’ More generally, Lino, supra n 
21 at 3 argues that ‘[t]hese two special features of written constitutions – their entrenchment and supremacy 
– mean that written constitutions can channel and limit state power in a way that is relatively enduring, 
definitive and legally potent.’ 
26 See, e.g., Kilkelly and O’Mahony, ‘The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running to Stand Still?’, 
(2007) 10(2) Irish Journal of Family Law 19. 
27 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 9 at para 59. 
28 Reynaert, Desmet, Lembrechts and Vanderhole, ‘Introduction: A critical approach to children’s rights’, in 
Vanderhole (ed), Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies (2015) at 5. 
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own human rights, and as competent to exercise these rights independently … this new image of 
childhood became one of the foundations of the CRC.’29 Agency is central to the CRC Committtee’s 
definition of a child rights approach (quoted above), which the Committee characterises as ‘the 
declaration of the child as rights holder and not a beneficiary of benevolent activities of adults’.30 
Similarly, Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Helen Kruuse describe ‘a constitutional vision of childhood as being 
defined by agency rather than purely welfarist-leaning dependency’ as being ‘consistent with the 
CRCs [sic.] conception of childhood as a state of evolving maturity’.31 
However, it is not always easy to neatly categorise a constitution as either a ‘special 
protection’ or a ‘children’s rights’ constitution (a point acknowledged by Tobin, particularly at the 
boundary between the ‘special protection constitution’ and the ‘children’s rights constitution’).32 It is 
not uncommon for constitutions to include provisions that cast children in both of these roles; 
indeed, the CRC itself contains a mixture of ‘special protection’ and ‘children’s rights’ provisions.33 
The analysis below will demonstrate that relatively few constitutions in the Council of Europe can be 
said to take entirely one approach or the other. Thus, rather than assigning constitutions to a single, 
rigid category, this paper situates constitutions along a spectrum of agency so as to allow for a more 
meaningful assessment of the extent to which the document as a whole leans towards a 
paternalistic special protection approach or towards a child-centred, child rights approach. 
Finally, the third spectrum, discussed in Part 5 below, seeks to fill a gap in the previous 
studies by examining Enforceability: how enforceable are children’s constitutional rights in a 
particular national constitution? This may range from completely unenforceable through a range of 
increasingly strong remedies along the spectrum. The absence of the issue of enforceability from 
previous studies means that the picture that they present is missing a crucial piece – one which 
determines both the practical value of constitutional provisions and the extent to which they comply 
with the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee. When it comes to children’s rights, Michael Freeman 
argues that ‘we must get beyond rhetoric. Rights without remedies are symbols, nothing more.’34 
And, as already noted, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed the importance of 
enforceability in General Comment No. 5.35 
Admittedly, both Freeman and the CRC Committee were referring to the enforceability of 
children’s rights in general rather than to the enforceability of constitutional rights in particular. 
Nonetheless, the point remains applicable: unless constitutional rights of children carry remedies for 
their enforcement, they are reduced to mere symbols that miss out on much of the added value that 
constitutional status can bring. Constitutional symbolism is not entirely without value, and some of 
that value has already been alluded to under the Visibility spectrum. Dylan Lino argues that 
constitutional symbols can help to positively shape attitudes, particularly towards groups who have 
been excluded in the past, and to serve as a focal point for political activism.36 However, there is a 
 
29 Verhellen, supra n 3 at 43. 
30 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 9 at para 65. 
31 Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse, supra n 25 at 675. See further Freeman, ‘Taking children’s rights more seriously’, 
(1992) 6 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 52 at 65: ‘To respect a child’s autonomy is to treat 
the child as a person and as a rights holder.’ 
32 Tobin, supra n 2 at 111, where he acknowledges that the extent to which states make the transition from a 
special protection or welfare based approach to a rights based approach varies, and gives the example of the 
Article 54 of the Albanian Constitution, which he says ‘tends to straddle both classifications’. 
33 See Verhellen, supra n 3 at 50-2. 
34 Freeman, supra n 22 at 8. 
35 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 6 at para 24. 
36 Lino, supra n 21 at 12. 
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limit to that value. Lino goes on to argue that mere symbolic constitutional recognition is, in a sense, 
self-contradictory. Where provisions are constitutionalised but rendered non-justiciable, this 
repudiates their constitutional significance, and ignores real grievances of excluded groups.37 Lino 
concludes: 
… symbolic recognition should not be dismissed out of hand, as it can have important 
benefits for those being recognised. But the best way to pursue symbolic recognition in 
written constitutions is through substantive constitutional reforms: the symbolism of 
properly constitutional recognition is more potent and coherent than wholly symbolic 
‘constitutional’ recognition … If a particular group is of such fundamental significance to the 
polity as to be recognised within the written constitution, surely such recognition should be 
constitutional in more than name only.38 
The limits of symbolism are perhaps even more pronounced when it comes to children’s 
rights than for adults’ rights due to the democratic deficit inherent in the fact that children, for the 
most part, cannot vote. While constitutionalising children’s rights can have a positive impact on 
political discourse, it must always be remembered that the political sphere is one from which 
children are systematically excluded. They have no independent capacity to advocate for their rights 
in political circles, and are entirely reliant on others to do so on their behalf. The effectiveness of 
indirect representation of children’s interests by parents and lobby groups is reduced by the fact 
that some groups of parents are marginalised in the political system, and that the interests of 
parents and those of their children do not always align.39 Moreover, even though voting adults can 
(unlike children) pursue their rights claims through political means, they still enjoy constitutional 
rights as a safety net in circumstances where democratic means are ineffective. As Aoife Nolan has 
persuasively argued, building on the work of John Hart Ely,40 the disenfranchisement of children 
means that the safety-net of constitutional enforcement would appear even more necessary for 
children than for adults, and thus the case for counter-majoritarian judicial enforcement of rights is 
particularly strong in the case of children’s rights.41 The extent to which this is possible is thus a key 
indicator of the quality of protection offered to children’s rights by a national constitution. 
In summary, building on previous studies in this area, this paper has identified three key 
spectrums by reference to which the quality of the protection offered to children’s rights by national 
constitutions will be assessed. The aim is to provide a typology through which a holistic and nuanced 
analysis can be made of the extent to which any given constitutional scheme coheres with the child 
rights approach envisaged by the CRC and the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee.  I will argue that 
as a constitution scores more highly on each spectrum, it achieves a greater level of harmony with 
this child rights approach. 
 
37 Ibid. at 13. 
38 Ibid. at 14. 
39 For a discussion of the limits to which the interests of children can be represented by others in the 
democratic system, see Nolan, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts (2011) at 43-92. 
Nolan concludes at 92 that ‘children’s views are not taken into account in democracy, due both to their 
exclusion from direct participation in majority-decision making processes and the frequent failure of those 
who do directly participate to effectively represent children’s views and interest. Thus, children have neither a 
direct nor indirect input into majority-decision making processes …’ 
40 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). 
41 Nolan, supra n 39 at 43-133. A similar point is made by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 2: The role of independent national human rights institutions in the promotion and protection 




3. THE VISIBILITY SPECTRUM 
The visibility of children and of children’s rights in national constitutions varies along a spectrum 
ranging from constitutions in which children are entirely invisible (Point 1) to constitutions that 
contain dedicated, detailed provisions setting out the constitutional rights of children and the duties 
that the state has to vindicate such rights (Point 4). In between these two extremes lie constitutions 
that contain provisions on education, without any other reference to children (Point 2); or that, in 
addition to education provisions, make some limited reference to children, either in discrete 
provisions addressing issues such as child labour or declaring the equality of children, irrespective of 
the marital status of their parents, or in general provisions on the family (Point 3). Drawing on a 
detailed analysis of the constitutions of Council of Europe member states, examples of each point on 
the spectrum will be given here. It is significant to note that by far the largest grouping on the 
spectrum, comprising over 20 member states, is states that have detailed constitutional provisions 
on children’s rights. 
 
A. Point 1: Invisible 
At the low point of the spectrum, there are just two member states that currently have no 
constitutional provisions on children in a codified constitution: France and the United Kingdom (UK). 
In both cases, however, significant qualifications apply to this initial statement. Section 55 of the 
French Constitution provides that ‘[t]reaties or agreements duly ratified and approved shall, upon 
publication, have an authority superior to that of legislation, subject, for each separate agreement or 
treaty, to reciprocal application by the other party.’ The CRC has been ratified by France, and its self-
implementing provisions can be applied directly by national courts, although the Cour de Cassation 
has held that at least some provisions of the Convention cannot.42 The UK does not have a codified 
written constitution; however, there are various disparate sources of UK constitutional law that 
make provision for children’s rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 indirectly incorporates the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law, and there are many examples of 
the national courts giving effect to children’s rights by interpreting national law in light of the right 
to family life under Article 8 of the Convention or declaring it incompatible with Article 8.43 Pending 
the outcome of the Brexit process, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (which protects children’s 
rights, inter alia, in Article 24) also forms part of UK law.44 Moreover, the devolved Governments in 
 
42 Lejeune case, Assemblé Nationale, Rapport No 87 ‘Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête sur 
l'état des droits de l'enfant en France, notamment au regard des conditions de vie des mineurs et de leur place 
dans la cite’ 6 May 1998 Journal Officiel 22; see Tobin, supra n 2 at 96-7 and Innocenti Research Centre, Law 
Reform and Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF: 2007) at 7. 
43 See, e.g., Re T (Paternity: Ordering Blood Tests) [2001] 2 FLR 1190; Mabon v Mabon [2005] EWCA Civ 634; Re 
P and others [2008] UKHL 38; ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, and 
Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam). See further Fortin, ‘Accommodating Children’s Rights in a Post 
Human Rights Act Era’, (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 299. Note that the ECHR also contains various other 
rights of relevance to children. The right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 
and the right to education under Article 2 of the First Protocol are particularly relevant, but other provisions 
have also generated case law concerning children’s rights. See generally Kilkelly, The Child and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1999). 
44 European Union (Amendment) Act 2008. 
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Scotland and Wales have taken measures to provide a degree of indirect incorporation of the CRC in 
their regions.45 
Until relatively recently, Austria and Norway could also have been situated at this point. 
However, in 2011, Austria enacted a new constitutional law specifically on children’s rights.46 In 
2014, Norway followed suit, when a new Article 104 dedicated to the protection of children’s rights 
was inserted into its constitution, along with a new Article 109 on the right to education.47 
Moreover, the CRC forms part of the domestic legal order in Norway and takes precedence over 
conflicting national statutes.48 
 
B. Point 2: Education 
The second point on the spectrum is Education, for the reason that an acknowledgement of the 
importance of education, or of a right to education, is the basic minimum level of constitutional 
acknowledgment of children in the states where children are not invisible in the constitutional text. 
Put another way, it is the first context in which they become visible in constitutional law. Education 
is sometimes the only context in which provisions on constitutional rights make reference to 
children. Seven member states have constitutions that are silent on children’s rights generally, but 
nonetheless contain provisions dealing with education, which is clearly a human right that is 
particularly applicable to (and significant for) children: Bosnia and Herzegovina,49 Cyprus,50 
Denmark,51 Liechtenstein,52 Luxembourg,53 Monaco54 and the Netherlands.55 Thus, education could 
be described as the entry point for children on to the constitutional stage. 
The presence of a constitutional right to education – particularly one that is enforceable 
through the courts – has significant potential to advance a children’s rights agenda. This is primarily 
because of the importance of education as a foundational right, the enjoyment of which is a pre-
requisite to the enjoyment of other rights.56 Education impacts on a range of other rights of children 
– most obviously, on the child’s development and realisation of his or her potential (emphasised 
throughout the CRC),57 but also specific rights such as the right to health. Moreover, a broad 
interpretation of education provisions can result in them having an expansive impact beyond the 
context of scholastic education in schools. This will particularly be the case for children with 
 
45 See Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 (section 2 of which requires public authorities in 
Scotland to report at intervals of three years on their implementation of the CRC) and the Rights of Children 
and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 (which requires all Welsh Ministers to have due regard to the 
substantive rights and obligations within the UNCRC and its optional protocols). 
46 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Rechte von Kindern, 15 February 2011, Article 4. 
47 Initial Report of Norway to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2 July 2015 at para 40, 
available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Disability/SocialProtection/States/Norway.docx  [last accessed 
8 April 2019]. 
48 See Lundy et al., The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: a study of legal implementation in 12 
countries (2012) at 58-9. 
49 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Section 3(l). 
50 Constitution of Cyprus, Article 20. 
51 Constitution of Denmark, Section 76. 
52 Constitution of Liechtenstein, Article 15. 
53 Constitution of Luxembourg, Article 23. 
54 Constitution of Monaco, Article 27. 
55 Constitution of the Netherlands, Article 23. 
56 See O’Mahony, supra n 25 at 126-8. 
57 See the Preamble and Articles 6, 18, 23, 27, 28, 29 and 32. 
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disabilities or special educational needs (who, for example, benefitted extensively from 
constitutional litigation based on the education provisions of the Irish Constitution),58 but also has 
the potential to impact on issues in other areas such as healthcare. 
Having said that, education provisions do not always take the form of children’s rights 
provisions, or even rights provisions per se. Some constitutions (namely those of Germany,59 
Ireland,60 Liechtenstein,61 Luxembourg62 and the Netherlands63) contain provisions on education 
that focus entirely on the rights and duties of parents and the state, without making any reference 
to an individual right of children to receive education. However, a constitutional right to education 
may have been recognised by way of court decision (as in Ireland)64 or in regional constitutions (as in 
Germany).65 
 
C. Point 3: Education+ 
Point 3 of the Visibility spectrum is named Education+ because it includes countries whose 
constitutions include the minimum of a provision on education, plus some other discrete and basic 
provisions relating to how children should be treated before the law. With the exception of France 
and the UK (the two states at Point 1), all other member state constitutions contain education 
provisions at a minimum; and so, as we move along the spectrum towards increasing visibility of 
children in constitutions, the question becomes: what else is there in addition? The first common 
addition to education provisions are constitutional provisions setting out minimum standards on the 
employment of children in the workforce (such as in Armenia66 and Malta67), or constitutional 
provisions stipulating that all children are equal before the law, irrespective of the marital status of 
their parents (as in Andorra,68 Germany69 and San Marino70). Since the provisions in question go no 
further than one of these two discrete issues (at least not explicitly71), this approach still constitutes 
 
58 See O’Mahony, Educational Rights in Irish Law (2006), Chapters 6 and 7. 
59 German Basic Law, Article 7. 
60 Constitution of Ireland, Article 42. 
61 Constitution of Liechtenstein, Articles 15 and 16. 
62 Constitution of Luxembourg, Article 23. 
63 Constitution of the Netherlands, Article 23. 
64 The right of children to receive education was recognised by the Irish Supreme Court in Crowley v Ireland 
[1980] IR 102 at 122 as being correlative to the duty of the State to provide education. 
65 Gesley, ‘Germany’, in Constitutional Right to an Education in Selected Countries (2016) at 15, available at: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/constitutional-right-to-an-education/constitutional-right-to-education.pdf  [last 
accessed 8 April 2019]. 
66 Constitution of Armenia, Article 32. 
67 Constitution of Malta, Section 16. 
68 Constitution of Andorra, Article 13.3. 
69 German Basic Law, Article 6(5). See Jones and Merino-Blanco, ‘The Influence of Constitutional Law on Family 
Forms in Germany and Spain’, (2008) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly 23 at 31-2. Note that while children’s 
rights receive little express recognition in the federal German constitution, they have received a far higher 
level of recognition in the constitutions of the German Länder: see Lundy et al., supra n 48 at 44-5. See also 
Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Germany to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/DEU/3-4, 20 
October 2010 at para 21. A similar situation pertained in Austria prior to the constitutional reforms of 2011; 
see Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Austria to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/AUT/3-4, 
29 September 2009, para 18. 
70 Constitution of San Marino, Article 12. 
71 The absence of explicitly stated rights in the text of a constitution does not necessarily mean that the 
national courts have not read certain children’s rights and associated obligations into the text. For example, in 
Germany, the obligation imposed on the state by Article 6(2) of the Basic Law to ‘watch over’ parents in the 
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a relatively minimal approach to constitutional provision for children’s rights – stronger than Point 2 
(Education), but weaker than Point 4 (Detailed children’s rights provisions). It should be noted that 
provisions of this sort also feature in many other constitutions alongside or as part of more detailed 
and specific provisions setting out the rights of children and the obligations owed by the state to 
them, as will be seen further below. 
Aside from these two specific issues, the next point at which children begin to commonly 
feature in the text of national constitutions is in provisions on the family that make some limited, 
indirect reference to children or to children’s rights. These tend to be a general guarantee rather 
than confined to the discrete issues of employment or equality. However, they are rather vague in 
nature and tend to take what Tobin describes as a ‘special protection’ rather than a ‘children’s 
rights’ approach.72 The most common formulation in this category is a subsection of a general 
provision on the family that guarantees special state protection to parents and children; this 
approach can be seen in Estonia,73 Iceland,74 Italy,75 Lithuania76 and the Russian Federation.77 The 
constitutions of Bulgaria,78 the Czech Republic79 and Macedonia80 combine provisions of this sort 
with one of the provisions described at Point 3 on the spectrum (and, in the case of Bulgaria, a 
specific obligation to protect abandoned children). A slightly different approach is taken in Georgia, 
where the constitution approaches the same issue using more rights-based language, providing that 
‘[t]he rights of the mother and the child shall be protected by law.’81 The Greek constitution 
occupies the same point on the spectrum, containing a little more detail, but not necessarily any 
more precision. Its provision on the family begins by stating that ‘[t]he family … as well as marriage, 
motherhood and childhood, shall be under the protection of the State,’82 and continues by 
stipulating that ‘[f]amilies with many children … are entitled to the special care of the State’83 and 
that the state ‘shall adopt special measures for the protection of youth’.84 
Constitutions at Point 3 of the Visibility spectrum make reference to education plus one or more 
of three specific issues affecting children. They acknowledge the vulnerability of children and their 
need for special protection, either in general or in the specific context of the workplace or of 
discrimination based on parentage. Thus, the particular needs of children are made visible in the 
constitutional scheme in a way that goes beyond education alone, but either in a very discrete 
context or at a relatively vague level that does not elaborate on what those needs entail or what 
specific duties they impose on the state. 
 
performance of their duty to care for and bring up their children has been interpreted as mandating the state 
to protect children’s rights and welfare; see Stintzing, ‘Constitutional Values and Social Change – The Case of 
German Marital and Family Law’, (1999) 13 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 132 at 134. 
72 See Tobin, supra n 2 at 94. 
73 Constitution of Estonia, § 27. 
74 Constitution of Iceland, Article 76. Discussions have been had about possible reform and the inclusion of a 
more comprehensive set of rights; see Lundy et al., supra n 48 at 80-1. 
75 Constitution of Italy, Article 31. 
76 Constitution of Lithuania, Article 38(2). 
77 Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 38. 
78 Constitution of Bulgaria, Articles 14 and 47. See Todorova, ‘Children’s Rights in Bulgaria after the End of 
Communism’, (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 623. 
79 Constitution of Czech Republic, Article 32. 
80 Constitution of Macedonia, Articles 40 and 42. 
81 Constitution of Georgia, Article 36. 
82 Constitution of Greece, Article 21(1). 
83 Constitution of Greece, Article 21(2). 




D. Point 4: Detailed children’s rights provisions 
At the high point of the spectrum are constitutions that contain detailed children’s rights provisions. 
These may take the form of stand alone provisions dedicated entirely to children, or detailed 
subsections of broader provisions dealing with the family that are dedicated to particular issues 
relating to children. It is common for these provisions to address the issues of employment, equality 
and protection described above at Points 3 and 4, and to build on them by elaborating the specific 
constitutional rights that children hold or specific duties that the state owes to children. Article 54 of 
the Albanian Constitution provides a good example of how these various provisions can be 
combined, and how they represent the movement along the visibility spectrum described here: 
1. Children, the young, pregnant women and new mothers have the right to special 
protection by the state. 
2. Children born out of wedlock have equal rights with those born within marriage. 
3. Every child has the right to be protected from violence, ill treatment, exploitation and 
their use for work, especially under the minimum age for work, which could damage their 
health and morals or endanger their life or normal development. 
In this provision, we see all elements of the previous point of the spectrum represented – 
equal status before the law irrespective of parent’s marital status; special protection in the 
workplace; and special protection more generally. In addition to all of these, a right to be protected 
from violence, ill treatment and exploitation is also set out in subsection 3. Notably, both this 
provision and the general reference to special protection in subsection 1 are phrased as rights of the 
child rather than as duties of the state to protect children from such treatment. A similar approach 
can be seen in Hungary, which combines provisions on the first three issues85 with a provision 
stating that ‘[e]very child shall have the right to the protection and care required for his or her 
proper physical, mental and moral development.’86 
Within the 20 or so member states that include detailed children’s rights provisions in their 
constitutions, there is a considerable diversity of approach. In Spain, the constitution includes a child 
protection provision as a subsection of a broader provision on the family,87 but additionally provides 
that ‘[c]hildren shall enjoy the protection provided for in the international agreements safeguarding 
their rights.’88 Some states make a very broad and general reference to the rights of the child, but 
provide little or no definition of what those rights include; examples of this approach include 
Azerbaijan89 and Latvia.90 By contrast, other states such as Moldova91 and Romania92 have an initial 
broad statement that children are entitled to a special form of assistance in the pursuit of their 
rights, but go on to build on this by specifying examples of particular rights of children and particular 
duties that the state owes to them. Clearly, the latter score more highly on the Visibility spectrum 
than the former. 
 
85 Articles XV and XVIII. 
86 Constitution of Hungary, Article XVI(1). 
87 Constitution of Spain, section 39(2); see Picontó-Novales, ‘The Application of Spanish Child Welfare Law’, 
(1998) 12 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 180 at 182. 
88 Constitution of Spain, section 39(4). 
89 Constitution of Azerbaijan, Article 17(vi). 
90 Constitution of Latvia, Article 110. 
91 Constitution of Moldova, Article 50(2). 
92 Constitution of Romania, Article 49(1). 
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The children’s right most commonly specified in member state constitutions is the right to 
be protected from violence, abuse or exploitation. The phrasing of this varies: in Albania,93 it is 
phrased as a right of children; in Montenegro94 and Slovenia,95 it is phrased as a guarantee owed to 
children; and in Portugal,96 it is phrased as an entitlement of children. In Poland, the constitution 
states that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to demand of organs of public authority that they defend 
children against violence, cruelty, exploitation’.97 In Serbia98 and Turkey,99 the constitution imposes 
a duty of the state to protect children from such treatment, while in Ukraine100 the constitution 
obliges the state to prosecute any violence against or exploitation of a child. In Belgium, the 
constitution uses quite a different formulation to address a broadly similar point, providing that 
‘[e]ach child is entitled to have its moral, physical, mental and sexual integrity respected.’101 
Some other examples of specific rights of children (or obligations to address certain needs of 
children) can be seen in a number of constitutions; for example, an obligation on the state to make 
special provision for disabled children (as distinct from a general obligation towards disabled 
persons) is set out in the constitutions of Croatia,102 Latvia,103 Moldova104 and Romania.105 The 
Serbian constitution contains a provision recognising a child’s right to identity.106 
Interestingly (and perhaps surprisingly), the four general principles of the CRC identified by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child do not feature especially prominently in the constitutions 
of Council of Europe member states. While three of the four are referenced in Article 104 of the 
Norwegian Constitution (with non-discrimination being the exception), many constitutions 
incorporate just one or perhaps even none of the four. The right to life, survival and development 
features most prominently, with the emphasis being placed on the development aspect. Some 
countries stipulate that children have a right to the fullest possible development of their personality 
and potential (Hungary,107 Portugal108 and Switzerland109); others reference development in a 
negative sense by imposing duties on the state to protect children from specific dangers to their 
development, such as economic exploitation (Albania,110 Hungary,111 Moldova112 and Romania113); 
 
93 Constitution of Albania, Article 54(3). 
94 Constitution of Montenegro, Article 74. 
95 Constitution of Slovenia, Article 56(2). 
96 Constitution of Portugal, Article 69(2). 
97 Constitution of Poland, Article 72(1). 
98 Constitution of Serbia, Article 64. 
99 Constitution of Turkey, Article 41. 
100 Constitution of Ukraine, Article 52. 
101 Constitution of Belgium, Article 22 bis. See further Lundy et al., supra n 48 at 37. 
102 Constitution of Croatia, Article 63(3). 
103 Constitution of Latvia, Article 110. 
104 Constitution of Moldova, Article 50(3). 
105 Constitution of Romania, Article 49(2). 
106 Constitution of Serbia, Article 64. See Kovaček Stanić, ‘Serbian Family Law: Rights of the Child’, (2009) 17 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 585 at 593. 
107 Constitution of Hungary, Article XVI(1). 
108 Constitution of Portugal, Article 69(1). 
109 Constitution of Switzerland, Article 11(1). 
110 Constitution of Albania, Article 54(3). 
111 Constitution of Hungary, Article XVIII(1). 
112 Constitution of Moldova, Article 50(4). 
113 Constitution of Romania, Article 49(3). 
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while others emphasise the importance of education to the development of children (Andorra,114 
Croatia,115 Portugal116 and Spain117). 
The other general principles of the CRC feature to varying degrees of prominence in national 
constitutions in the Council of Europe member states. Non-discrimination features relatively 
commonly, with 18 constitutions containing provisions addressing the equality of children; however, 
apart from Finland118 and Portugal,119 these provisions tend to be restricted to discrimination based 
on the marital status of parents and do not extend to discrimination on other grounds (although, of 
course, it is common for constitutions to contain general equality guarantees that are not specific to, 
and may be relied on by, children). The right of children to be heard in decisions that affect them is 
set out in the constitutions of Austria,120 Ireland,121 Norway122 and Poland,123 and also features in the 
constitutional case law of some other states.124 Broader participation provisions feature elsewhere; 
three states have provisions stating that public authorities have a duty to establish conditions that 
allow children to participate freely in society (Sweden125) or in the political, social, economic, cultural 
and sporting life of the country (Moldova126 and Romania127). The best interests principle is explicitly 
set out in the constitutions of just four member states (Austria,128 Ireland,129 Norway130 and 
Serbia131), although it has featured in the constitutional case law of other states.132 
In summary, analysis of the Visibility spectrum shows that the extent to which children are 
visible in the constitutions of Council of Europe member states varies considerably. A small minority 
of the 47 states score at the lower end of the spectrum where children are either completely 
invisible or are only mentioned in the context of an education provision, while just under half of the 
states score highly by including detailed provisions on children. In between these two extremes lie a 
significant number of states where children are mentioned only in respect of the specific issues of 
education, equal status and protection from harm or exploitation. The highest level of visibility is 
achieved by constitutions such as Austria, Poland or Portugal, which include dedicated, stand alone 
provisions that address a variety of key children’s rights issues. 
 
114 Constitution of Andorra, Article 20(1). 
115 Constitution of Croatia, Article 63(2).  
116 Constitution of Portugal, Article 73(2). 
117 Constitution of Spain, Section 29(2). 
118 Constitution of Finland, Section 6(2). 
119 Constitution of Portugal, Article 69(2). 
120 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Rechte von Kindern, 15 February 2011, Article 4. 
121 Constitution of Ireland, Article 42A.4. 
122 Constitution of Norway, Article 104. 
123 Constitution of Poland, Article 73(3). 
124 See, e.g., Long, ‘The Impact of the UNCRC on the Italian Legal System’, (2009) 17 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 155 at 161-162. See also Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Germany to the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/DEU/3-4, 20 October 2010 at para 91, and Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of 
Spain to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/ESP/3-4, 30 May 2008 at paras.308 and 451. 
125 Constitution of Sweden, Article 2. 
126 Constitution of Moldova, Article 50(5). 
127 Constitution of Romania, Article 49(5). 
128 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Rechte von Kindern, 15 February 2011, Article 1. 
129 Constitution of Ireland, Article 42A. 
130 Constitution of Norway, Article 104. 
131 Constitution of Serbia, Article 65. 
132 See, e.g., Askola, ‘Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland’, (2011) 25 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 100 at 107 and Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Spain to the Committee on the 




4. THE AGENCY SPECTRUM 
The Visibility spectrum assessed the scope of constitutional protection offered to children’s rights; in 
contrast, the Agency spectrum will assess the manner of that protection. As highlighted in Part 2 
above, the CRC requires a rights-based approach to children’s needs and interests, which the CRC 
Committee defines in General Comment No. 13 as ‘a paradigm shift away from child protection 
approaches in which children are perceived and treated as “objects” in need of assistance rather 
than as rights holders entitled to non-negotiable rights to protection. A child rights approach is one 
which furthers the realization of the rights of all children as set out in the Convention by developing 
the capacity of duty bearers to meet their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil rights (art. 4) and 
the capacity of rights holders to claim their rights …’133 The presence of participation rights in 
particular is one of the hallmarks of recognising the Agency of children; as argued by Habashi et al., 
‘efforts to incorporate only some aspects of the CRC, namely those entailed within the domains of 
protection and provision while excluding the domain of participation, enforces the images of 
vulnerability and maturity rather than encouraging children’s potential as decision making 
partners.’134 
An analysis of European constitutional instruments shows that the children’s provisions in these 
documents can be positioned at different points on a spectrum ranging from a paternalistic 
approach which considers children as objects requiring protection of the law but lacking any 
autonomy or independent rights (Point 1), to a rights-based approach which reflects the concept of 
children as autonomous rights-holders who are empowered to independently assert those rights 
(Point 4). In between, there are constitutions that take a mixed approach by including both 
paternalistic and child-centred provisions, with the emphasis leaning in one direction or the other 
(Points 2 and 3). Significantly, Visibility and Agency do not walk entirely hand-in-hand; the fact that 
children are highly visible in a constitution does not mean that their agency is well respected.  
 
A. Point 1: Paternalistic 
One way for a constitution to take a paternalistic approach towards children would be to say very 
little about them, and thus to fail to expressly acknowledge that children are independent rights-
holders. As such, it could be said that constitutions that score poorly on the Visibility spectrum will, 
for the most part, also score poorly on the Agency spectrum (if not necessarily always; it will be seen 
at Point 4 on the Agency spectrum that there are examples of constitutions which score poorly on 
Visibility but yet score highly on Agency).135 On the other hand, a constitution might score well on 
Visibility and yet take a highly or even entirely paternalistic stance. Paternalistic constitutional 
provisions are ones which conceptualise children solely in terms of their vulnerability and need for 
protection without any acknowledgment of their capacity to be autonomous rights-holders. This 
approach rarely uses rights language and often groups children together with other perceived 
vulnerable groups like mothers. A good example of this approach can be seen in Articles 62 and 64 
of the Croatian Constitution, which – notwithstanding its drafting after the enactment of the CRC, 
 
133 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 9 at para 59. 
134 Habashi et al., supra n 2 at 282. 
135 There are examples of constitutions which score poorly on Visibility but yet score highly on Agency: see the 
discussion of Point 3 on the Agency spectrum below. 
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and its inclusion of a detailed provision dedicated to children – takes a highly paternalistic approach 
that is devoid of the language of children’s rights: 
62. The State shall protect maternity, children and young people, and shall create social, 
cultural, educational, material and other conditions promoting the right to a decent life. 
64(1) Everyone shall have the duty to protect children and helpless persons. 
(2) Children may not be employed before reaching the legally determined age, nor may they 
be forced or allowed to do work which is harmful to their health or morality. 
(3) Young people, mothers and disabled persons shall be entitled to special protection at 
work. 
While Croatia provides an example of high Visibility but low levels of Agency, it is more common 
for constitutions that score poorly on Agency to also score poorly on Visibility by including only a 
passing reference to children that is framed purely in terms of protection, with no reference to 
children possessing any rights (save perhaps for a reference to the ‘equal rights’ of children born 
within or outside of wedlock). Such provisions generally guarantee ‘special protection’ to children, 
either alone or in conjunction with their mothers or families. Examples of this approach include 
Bulgaria,136 the Czech Republic,137 Estonia,138 Greece,139 Macedonia140 and Ukraine.141 A further 
approach is where ‘childhood’ as a concept is deemed worthy of protection rather than children as 
individual human beings. This abstraction removes children further from being subjects of rights. 
This is the formulation used in the constitutions of Azerbaijan,142 Lithuania143 and the Russian 
Federation.144 
 
B. Point 2: Predominantly paternalistic 
Whereas Tobin broadly labelled constitutions as either being ‘special protection’ constitutions or 
‘children’s rights’ constitutions, the reality is that many Council of Europe member states have 
constitutions that contain both types of provisions, with the emphasis leaning either towards a 
paternalistic or a child-centred approach. While allowing children’s vulnerability alone to define 
them is paternalistic, the fact remains that children are especially vulnerable to certain types of 
harm and should be protected accordingly. As such, it is common to include provisions focused on 
child protection in national constitutions; Part 3 above showed that some of the most common 
constitutional provisions concerning children are those that refer to protection from violence, harm 
or exploitation (particularly economic exploitation). Such provisions commonly feature side-by-side 
with provisions that take a more modern view of children as rights-holders, but the balance between 
paternalistic and child-centred language can vary. Point 2 of the Agency spectrum includes 
constitutions which make some references to children as rights-holders, while still using 
 
136 Constitution of Bulgaria, Article 14. 
137 Constitution of Czech Republic, Article 32(1). 
138 Constitution of Estonia, Section 27. 
139 Constitution of Greece, Article 21(1). 
140 Constitution of Macedonia, Article 42. 
141 Constitution of Ukraine, Article 51. 
142 Constitution of Azerbaijan, Article 34(II). 
143 Constitution of Lithuania, Article 38(2). 
144 Constitution of Russian Federation, Articles 7 and 38. 
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predominantly paternalistic ‘special protection’ language. A striking example of this contrast can be 
seen in Articles 73 and 74 of the Constitution of Montenegro: 
Article 73 
Mother and child shall enjoy special protection. 
Article 74 
A child shall enjoy rights and freedoms appropriate to his age and maturity. 
A child shall be guaranteed special protection from psychological, physical, economic and any 
other exploitation or abuse. 
Here, two provisions refer to children solely in terms of their vulnerability and need for 
protection, but they book-end a provision that employs a classic example of children’s rights 
language by acknowledging that children’s rights grow stronger as they grow older and more 
mature. Thus, a mixed approach is evident, albeit one that is more paternalistic than child-centred. A 
similar tendency can be seen in Slovenia: 
Article 56 (Rights of Children) 
(1) Children shall enjoy special protection and care. Children shall enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and maturity.  
(2) Children shall be guaranteed special protection from economic, social, physical, mental 
or other exploitation and abuse. Such protection shall be regulated by law.  
(3) Children and minors who are not cared for by their parents, who have no parents or who 
are without proper family care shall enjoy the special protection of the state. Their position 
shall be regulated by law. 
Again, while this provision avoids an entirely paternalistic approach by recognising the evolving 
capacities of children, the emphasis is on protecting children rather than recognising their agency. 
 
C. Point 3: Predominantly child-centred 
The paternalistic emphasis contained in the mixed approaches of Montenegro and Slovenia is 
reversed elsewhere, so that, while the approach remains a mixed one, the emphasis is more child-
centred. An example is provided by Article 11 of the Swiss Constitution: 
Art. 11 Protection of children and young people 
1 Children and young people have the right to the special protection of their integrity and to 
the encouragement of their development. 
2 They may personally exercise their rights to the extent that their power of judgement 
allows. 
In this example, there is one protective provision and one provision focused on agency; but 
the latter is phrased quite strongly, and is indicative of a child-centred philosophy rather than a 
paternalistic one. In Romania, the lines are blurred by the opening subsection of Article 48, which 
provides that ‘[c]hildren and young people shall enjoy special protection and assistance in the 
pursuit of their rights.’ This provision, which could be interpreted with the emphasis either on 
‘special protection’ or on assisting children ‘in the pursuit of their rights’, is followed by three classic 
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special protection provisions, before Article 48(5) concludes by providing that ‘public authorities are 
bound to contribute to secure the conditions for the free participation of young people in the 
political, social, economic, cultural and sporting life of the country’. Thus, the Romanian Constitution 
mixes the language of paternalism and protection with the language of rights, autonomy and 
participation. The text of the document itself appears somewhat more paternalistic than child-
centred; but it has the potential to be read either way, and the limited English-language literature 
that is available suggests that the approach taken both in legislative implementation of children’s 
constitutional rights and in interpretation of those rights by the courts has been a largely child-
centred one.145 
The mixed approach evident at points 2 and 3 on the Agency spectrum is preferable to the 
paternalistic approach in that it provides at least some recognition of the agency of children as 
autonomous rights-holders and provides a platform upon which such an approach can be developed 
across government institutions. At the same time, the presence of more paternalistic references may 
act as a constitutional anchor for attitudes that view children solely in terms of vulnerability and 
protection, and thus serve to hamper the development of a true children’s rights perspective. 
Therefore, within the mixed approach, constitutions at point 3, which are predominantly child-
centred, are clearly more in harmony with the CRC than the predominantly paternalistic 
constitutions at point 2. 
 
D. Point 4: Child-centred 
At the high point of the Agency spectrum are constitutions which portray children as independent, 
autonomous rights-holders. This does not mean that no reference is made to protecting children 
(even the CRC recognises that children should be protected from harm146); it means that, as a whole, 
the tenor of the provisions is rights-based. As explained above, the CRC requires a rights-based 
approach to children’s issues and concerns that gives expression to the rights of children as 
individual, autonomous rights-holders. Thus, constitutions that take a similar approach will achieve 
the greatest degree of harmony with the child rights approach envisaged by the CRC. Such an 
approach can be seen in Article 54 of the Albanian Constitution (quoted above) and Article 72 of the 
Polish Constitution: 
(1) The Republic of Poland shall ensure protection of the rights of the child. Everyone shall 
have the right to demand of organs of public authority that they defend children against 
violence, cruelty, exploitation and actions which undermine their moral sense. 
(2) A child deprived of parental care shall have the right to care and assistance provided by 
public authorities. 
 
145 See, e.g., Simion and Criste, ‘Constitutional Protection of Children and Youth in Romania’, (2017) Fiat 
Iustitia, No. 1/2017 at 263, and Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Romania to the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, CRC/C/ROM/4, 18 November 2008 (discussing throughout Law 272/2004 on the protection and 
promotion of child rights). 
146 Note that the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee has been criticised for taking a paternalistic approach to 
the right of children to development: see Peleg, ‘Developing the Right to Development’, (2017) 25 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 380. 
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(3) Organs of public authority and persons responsible for children, in the course of 
establishing the rights of a child, shall consider and, insofar as possible, give priority to the 
views of the child. 
Here, we can see that all three subsections speak in terms of the rights of the child, and one of the 
four general principles – the right to be heard – is specifically included. Aside from Albania and 
Poland, other constitutions to include detailed provisions that are entirely or very heavily focused on 
children as independent rights-holders include Austria,147 Norway,148 Portugal149 and Serbia.150 
While the examples mentioned above are all detailed rights-focused provisions, there are 
other constitutions which are less detailed (and which therefore score lower on Visibility), but which 
still characterise children as autonomous rights-holders rather than as objects of protection. There 
are two types of provisions which are of particular relevance in this regard: those which provide for 
participation rights and those which recognise the evolving capacity of children. While they may 
feature as part of a detailed children’s rights provision (such as in Poland, Romania or Slovenia), they 
may also feature in a constitution in which children’s rights are less visible; but their presence 
provides a powerful recognition of the Agency of children. Finland is one example: aside from the 
right to education, Finland only includes a single child-specific provision in its constitution (section 
6(3)), but it is a classic recognition of the agency of children as independent rights-holders: ‘Children 
shall be treated equally and as individuals and they shall be allowed to influence matters pertaining 
to themselves to a degree corresponding to their level of development.’ Sweden has a similar but 
arguably less effective provision stating that ‘public institutions shall promote the opportunity for all 
to attain participation and equality in society and for the rights of the child to be safeguarded.’151 
While in a similar vein to the Finnish provision, it does not address the issue of evolving capacities, 
and could be more explicit in emphasising the importance of the participation of children (rather 
than just referring to ‘all’, albeit in a provision that references children’s rights in the next clause). 
In summary, the Agency spectrum measures something different to the Visibility spectrum: 
the manner in which children are portrayed in a constitution (i.e. as objects of concern or as 
autonomous rights-holders) as distinct from the range of children’s rights which are protected in the 
constitutional scheme. While low Visibility in a constitution often correlates with low Agency being 
afforded to children, this is not always the case, and exceptions arise in either combination.  Perhaps 
the most interesting finding in this section is the tendency of a significant number of constitutions to 
take a mixed approach that is neither entirely paternalistic nor entirely rights-focused, with old-style 
special protection provisions appearing side-by-side with modern children’s rights provisions. 
As with Visibility, this paper argues that a constitution will be more in line with the child 
rights approach envisaged by the CRC if it scores highly on the Agency spectrum. Constitutions like 
those of Austria, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Serbia score highly on both spectrums, and are thus 
(subject to the analysis in Part 5 below) leading the way up to this point in the discussion. However, 
it is important to state that a clause which has high potential on paper for the recognition of children 
as autonomous rights holders can still be interpreted by courts in a paternalistic fashion if it is not 
accompanied by a change of culture and mind-set among the judiciary. Indeed, Article 72 of the 
Polish Constitution was cited above as an exemplar of point 4 on the Agency spectrum, and has been 
 
147 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Rechte von Kindern, 15 February 2011. 
148 Constitution of Norway, Article 104. 
149 Constitution of Portugal, Article 69. 
150 Constitution of Serbia, Article 64. 
151 Constitution of Sweden, Article 2. 
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praised by the CRC Committee as embodying many of the principles of the CRC.152 Nevertheless, 
there is evidence of the Polish Constitutional Court taking a relatively paternalistic stance that 
emphasises child welfare and protection over autonomy and participation,153 and Poland has been 
the subject of criticism by the Committee for failing to ensure that domestic laws comply with the 
Convention, even in areas specifically addressed by constitutional provisions on children.154 Enacting 
child-centred constitutional provisions is merely the first step; generating enthusiasm for a child-
centred approach to interpreting and applying those provisions is another matter altogether. 
 
5. THE ENFORCEABILITY SPECTRUM 
While the earlier section on Visibility assessed the extent to which children’s rights are given express 
recognition in the constitutions of member states, this only tells part of the story, since the inclusion 
of a right in a constitutional document does not necessarily provide a remedial avenue in the event 
of a failure to vindicate that right. A key indicator in assessing the level of constitutional protection 
of children’s rights is the extent to which those rights are enforceable, whether through the courts 
or through another mechanism such as a children’s ombudsman. Tobin makes the point that the 
‘significance of any constitutionally recognised right quickly diminishes when no means of 
enforcement is provided for … with the additional complication that children often lack the capacity 
to exercise their rights, or otherwise to ensure enforcement, even in situations where the 
constitutional provisions look admirable on paper.’155 
A comprehensive assessment of the enforceability of children’s constitutional rights across 
all 47 Council of Europe member states is outside the scope of this paper, since it would require an 
assessment of case law, legislation, policy, practice and attitudes, all of which combine to determine 
the extent to which a right can be enforced.156 Instead, examples will be given of varying approaches 
to enforceability, which can vary along a spectrum from completely unenforceable, to enforceability 
through administrative remedies such as a children’s ombudsman, to enforceability through the 
courts using weak or strong judicial remedies (such as interpreting laws in light of children’s rights; 
declaring laws, actions or inactions to be in breach of rights and possibly invalidating them in the 
process; awarding damages; or granting injunctions ordering actions to be taken or ceased). 
Any attempt to draw firm conclusions on enforceability is further complicated by the fact 
that within a single constitution, some rights might be more enforceable than others: for example, 
 
152 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations regarding Poland, 30 October 2002, 
CRC/C/15/Add.194 at para 4. 
153 See, e.g., Case K 16/10, Constitutional Court of Poland, Judgment of 11 October 2011, in which legislation 
providing that children under 16 had no decision-making capacity in medical matters was upheld as 
compatible with Article 72. The Court justified this decision by describing child welfare as a ‘fundamental value 
in the Polish legal order’ and holding that Article 72(3) ‘qualifies’ the fundamental rights provisions of Article 
41-47 by making their applicability to children conditional on a child’s intellectual capacities and degree of 
maturity. I am grateful to Katarzyna Wazynska-Finck for bringing this case to my attention. 
154 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations regarding Poland, 30 October 2002, 
CRC/C/15/Add.194 at paras 11, 30-34 and 44-45, and Concluding Observations regarding Poland, 30 October 
2015, CRC/C/POL/CO/3-4 at paras 22-26 and 42. 
155 Tobin, supra n 2 at 118. 
156 See Maurás, ‘Public Policies and Child Rights: Entering the Third Decade of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’, (2011) 633 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 52, who emphasises 
public policy as a key component of the enforcement and enforceability of children’s rights, and Tobin, supra n 
2 at 120-125, who examines the role played by access to justice, judicial conservatism and social legitimacy in 
contributing to the enforceability or otherwise of the constitutional rights of children. 
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civil and political rights tend to be more enforceable than economic and social rights.157 Moreover, 
as important as the Enforceability spectrum is, it is essential to read it in conjunction with the other 
spectrums, since a state might have strong enforcement mechanisms for children’s rights, but the 
rights that are protected might not in themselves be very strong. For example, while children’s rights 
under the German Constitution are enforceable, the rights expressly included in that Constitution 
are limited to a right to education and a right to equal treatment before the law, irrespective of the 
marital status of the child’s parents.158 A further complication here is the role of international law in 
a domestic legal system. A country might have minimal protection for children’s rights in its 
constitution, but it may have incorporated the CRC into its domestic law in a very strong form, 
meaning that the whole range of children’s rights protected by the CRC are enforceable 
notwithstanding their absence from the text of national constitution. France and Spain provide good 
illustrations of this latter situation.159 
With the above in mind, the analysis will proceed along a four-point spectrum: unenforceable 
(Point 1), administrative remedies (Point 2), weak judicial remedies (Point 3) and strong judicial 
remedies (Point 4). It is important to acknowledge that these are not water-tight compartments. 
Some scholars have questioned the validity of distinctions such as ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ judicial 
remedies,160 and equally it will be seen that administrative remedies can overlap with judicial 
remedies. This is where the spectrum approach to analysis proves to be so useful, because it 
accounts for the fact that it is not always possible to draw a clear line demarcating the progression 
from one point to another; but at the same time, progression becomes visible on a larger scale 
where differences are clearer.  
 
A. Point 1: Unenforceable 
In some (admittedly rare) cases, constitutions contain provisions regarding children’s rights that are 
entirely non-justiciable, and may be expressly stated to be so. For example, the Irish Constitution 
contains a provision in Article 45 entitled ‘Directive Principles of Social Policy’, in which the state 
pledges, inter alia, to safeguard the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community 
(including, in particular, orphans),161 and to endeavour to ensure that ‘the tender age of children 
shall not be abused’ and that citizens, including children, shall not be ‘forced by economic necessity’ 
to engage in labour ‘unsuited to their sex, age or strength’.162 However, these Directive Principles of 
Social Policy are made expressly non-justiciable: a preambular paragraph stipulates that they are for 
the guidance of the Oireachtas (Parliament) only, and shall not be cognisable by any court under any 
provision of the Constitution. Thus, no remedy is available in the event of a failure to vindicate the 
rights envisaged by these constitutional provisions. Provisions of this nature are entirely symbolic; 
and as discussed in Part 2 above, the benefits of purely symbolic provisions are extremely limited. 
Colm Ó Cinnéide has observed that ‘the purely expressive nature of Article 45 in particular has 
prevented its provisions from acquiring any meaningful legal or political traction … As a 
 
157 Tobin, supra n 2 at 119. 
158 Note, however, that the German courts have read certain children’s rights and associated obligations into 
the text; see supra n 71. 
159 See text accompanying n 42 and 88 supra. 
160 See, e.g., Kavanagh, ‘What’s so weak about ‘weak-form review’? The case of the UK Human Rights Act 
1998’, (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1008. 
161 Constitution of Ireland, Article 45.4.1°. 
162 Constitution of Ireland, Article 45.4.2°. 
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consequence, it has in effect become a constitutional dead letter.’163 (It should be noted, however, 
that there are other provisions on children’s rights in the Irish Constitution that are enforceable 
through the courts, and some reference will be made to this below.) 
 
B. Point 2: Administrative Remedies 
An increasingly common and relatively accessible form of remedy for breaches of children’s 
constitutional rights is through an administrative body such as some form of ombudsman (which 
may be a general ombudsman or a specific children’s ombudsman; the latter institution is present in 
a large majority of member states).164 In keeping with the spectrum approach to analysis, the 
powers available to children’s ombudspersons varies considerably from state to state. At the weaker 
end, children’s ombudspersons have a function of acting as a spokesperson for children’s rights, 
lobbying government and perhaps preparing an annual report that is submitted to the legislature or 
executive.165 A stronger power is where they are authorised to investigate individual complaints and 
make findings of failures by administrative agencies to adequately observe children’s rights, and to 
make recommendations on how this could be avoided in the future.166 Recommendations of these 
sort are often not legally binding on the parties to whom they are addressed; however, they still 
have important potential to enforce and advance children’s rights. Osian Rees argues that ‘there is 
evidence of individual cases bringing about broader changes’,167 and the CRC Committee has stated 
that children’s ombudspersons or other national human rights institutions ‘must have the power to 
consider individual complaints and petitions and carry out investigations, including those submitted 
on behalf of or directly by children.’168 
In some states, an ombudsman has extensive powers beyond those mentioned above. For 
example, in Serbia, the Ombudsman is authorised to submit to the Government or to the National 
Assembly an initiative to amend laws and other regulations, if he/she deems that violations of the 
rights of citizens occur due to deficiencies in the regulations, as well as to initiate the passing of new 
laws or other regulations when he/she deems it significant for the realisation and protection of 
 
163 Ó Cinnéide, ‘Zones of Constitutionalisation’ and the Regulation of State Power: The Missing Social 
Dimension to the Irish Constitutional Order’, (2014) 37 Dublin University Law Journal 173 at 197-8. 
164 The European Network of Ombudspersons for Children has 34 members; see http://enoc.eu/?page_id=210  
[last accessed 8 April 2019]. Other Council of Europe member states who are not members of this network also 
have a similar institution, such as Austria and Poland. 
165 Examples of this approach are referenced in UNICEF, Innocenti Digest: Ombudswork for Children (2007) at 
9, available at: https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest1e.pdf [last accessed 8 April 2019]. 
166 Williams, ‘Effective Government Structures for Children?: The UK's Four Children's Commissioners’, (2005) 
17 Child and Family Law Quarterly 37 at 50 argues that a children’s ombudsman which has the power to 
investigate individual complaints is ‘more of an effective ‘champion’ on the issues that the children themselves 
feel they need to raise individually’. As against this, the UNICEF Innocenti Centre argues that ‘because of the 
risk ombudsmen for children run of being engulfed by casework and because of the vastness of the issues they 
must tackle and the non-binding nature of their decisions, it is far from clear that such an approach is the most 
appropriate model for providing children with effective avenues for redress … as an alternative to ombudsmen 
being the primary avenue for all complaints, their time might be better focused on developing comprehensive 
opportunities for children to challenge breaches of their rights through independent complaints procedures 
linked to all services.’ See UNICEF, supra n 165 at 7.  
167 Rees, ‘Dealing with Individual Cases: An Essential Role for National Human Rights Institutions for Children?’, 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 417 at 434; see further ibid. at 426-9. 
168 Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra n 41 at para 13. 
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citizens’ rights. The Government or the competent committee of the National Assembly are obliged 
to consider the initiatives submitted by the Ombudsman.169 
A children’s ombudsman is not the only way in which administrative remedies can be 
provided for breaches of children’s constitutional rights. In addition to its Ombudsman’s office 
having a vice-president specifically focusing on children’s rights issues, Romania has established a 
National Authority for the Protection of Children’s Rights to defend against children’s rights 
violations at the hands of private actors.170 In Hungary, a wide range of administrative bodies – some 
of which are dedicated child-focused bodies and some of which are not – are given specific 
responsibilities in order to assist the courts with the task of vindicating the constitutional rights of 
children. These include the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights; the representative of 
children’s rights (child protection); the Office of the Ministerial Commissioner Responsible for the 
Rights of the Child; the Ministerial Commissioner for Education Rights; the General Prosecutor; and 
special interest forums in child protection and child welfare institutions. Each of these bodies has a 
variety of functions specifically directed towards remedying violations of children’s constitutional 
rights, including receiving and investigating complaints, engaging in mediation, making 
recommendations and preparing reports.171 
The line between Point 2 of the Enforceability spectrum (Administrative Remedies) and Points 3 
and 4 (Judicial Remedies) can become blurred in some systems, where the Ombudsman for Children 
or other administrative agencies are authorised to commence litigation to enforce children’s rights. 
This is the case in Serbia, where the Ombudsman is also authorized to initiate proceedings before 
the Constitutional Court for the assessment of the legality and constitutionality of laws, other 
regulations and general by-laws which govern issues related to the liberties and rights of citizens.172 
Similar powers are afforded to the Ombudsman in Poland,173 Romania174 and to some administrative 
agencies in Hungary.175 
 
C. Point 3: Weak Judicial Remedies 
The most obvious way in which constitutional rights can be enforced is through litigation in the 
courts. However, litigation is not a remedy in itself, but rather a gateway to a variety of remedies; 
courts have a wide range of tools at their disposal to remedy rights violations, and some of those 
tools are more powerful than others. At Point 3 in the Enforceability spectrum are what 
 
169 Initial Report of Serbia and Montenegro to Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/SRB/1, 31 August 
2007 at paras 36-7. 
170 Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Romania to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/ROM/4, 
18 November 2008 at paras 16, 68, 69 and 75. 
171 Second Report of Hungary to Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/70/Add.25, 24 May 2005 at paras 
57-69. 
172 Initial Report of Serbia and Montenegro to Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/SRB/1, 31 August 
2007 at para 36-37. 
173 Rogalska-Piechota, ‘The Ombudsman for Children for Poland: A Model for Namibia?’, in Ruppel (ed), 
Children’s Rights in Namibia (2009) at 398-400, available at: 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Children_Rights/Children_w.pdf [last accessed 8 
April 2019]. 
174 Selejan-Guta, The Constitution of Romania: A Contextual Analysis (2016), Chapter 6(IV)(B). See further Third 
and Fourth Periodic Reports of Romania to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/ROM/4, 18 
November 2008 at paras 69-74. 




constitutional lawyers tend to call ‘weak’ judicial remedies: remedies that draw the attention of the 
other branches of government to a rights issue, but do not actively interfere in the work of the 
executive or legislative branches. One example would be an award of damages; this is a weak 
remedy in that it is restricted to an individual plaintiff, and is really only directed at past behaviour 
rather than future compliance. Damages do not in themselves remedy an ongoing breach of rights 
since they do not compel the branch of government responsible for the rights violation to adjust its 
behaviour (although they do provide an incentive to do so). Damages have been awarded for 
breaches of the right to education under the Irish Constitution, although the courts have themselves 
acknowledged their inadequacy as a remedy.176 
Another example of a weak judicial remedy is declaratory relief, whereby a court declares 
that a right exists or is being violated, but leaves it to the other branches to decide on how to 
address that violation. This approach can be seen in the UK; the Human Rights Act 1998 (which, in 
the absence of a codified written constitution, provides a source of constitutional law that performs 
similar functions to a constitutional bill of rights) grants courts the power to make declarations of 
incompatibility where Acts of Parliament cannot be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with 
the UK’s obligations under the ECHR.177 A number of such declarations have been made on the basis 
of a failure to vindicate a right of a child under the ECHR.178 Notably, however, a declaration of 
incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998 does not render the offending law invalid179 – it 
merely draws the executive’s attention to the incompatibility in question. It is up to the Government 
to respond and to cause the legislation to be amended in order to bring it into line with the ECHR.180 
Although theoretically, the Government might refuse to do so, the evidence indicates that, to date, 
it has invariably taken the necessary action (albeit sometimes rather reluctantly).181 
Declaratory relief also operates under the Irish Constitution, whereby the courts will sometimes 
declare that a constitutional right has been breached, but make it clear that the purpose of the 
declaration is to elicit a response from the executive branch, whose function it is to decide upon the 
detail of how the right should be vindicated.182 In essence, this approach shows a willingness to find 
that particular policies fall short of vindicating constitutional rights, but not to stipulate the details of 
a policy that would adequately discharge constitutional obligations. A similar approach is evident in 
the case law of the German Constitutional Court in relation to the constitutionally guaranteed 
minimum standard of living. The Court has ordered the Government to review a welfare benefit 
 
176 See, e.g., Cronin v Minister for Education [2004] 3 IR 205 at 214, as discussed in O’Mahony, supra n 58 at 
paras 8-08 to 8-16. 
177 Section 4(2). 
178 See supra n 43. 
179 Section 4(6). 
180 In circumstances where a declaration of incompatibility has been made under section 4, section 10 of the 
Act authorises a Minister by order to ‘make such amendments to the legislation as he considers necessary to 
remove the incompatibility’.  
181 Kavanagh, supra n 160 at 1025. See further Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgments: 
Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Government’s response to Human Rights judgments 
2014-16 (2016) at 45-62, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570753/responding-to-
human-rights-judgments-2014-to-2016.pdf [last accessed 8 April 2019]. 
182 See, e.g., O’Donoghue v. Minister for Health [1996] 2 IR 20 at 71, where O’Hanlon J stated: ‘In a case like the 
present one it should normally be sufficient to grant declaratory relief in the expectation that the institutions 
of the State would respond by taking whatever action was appropriate to vindicate the constitutional rights of 
the successful applicant.’ 
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policy that had failed to adequately evaluate child-specific rights and needs;183 similarly to the Irish 
case law, the Court was willing to declare the policy in question unconstitutional, but the task of 
reformulating it in line with the Constitution fell to the executive, not the courts. 
 
D. Point 4: Strong Judicial Remedies 
As described here, strong judicial remedies involve the courts issuing decisions that have the effect 
of immediately and directly addressing a rights violation. As with Point 3, this can take a number of 
different forms. At the lower end, involving less judicial interference with the work of the other 
branches of government, lies the mechanism used in some states where the courts interpret lower 
laws in light of constitutionally-protected children’s rights. This occurs in the UK, where the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (which, as already noted, fulfils a similar role in UK law to a constitutional bill of 
rights) obliges courts to interpret laws in a manner that is compatible with the UK’s obligations 
under the ECHR.184 It may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that a mere interpretive duty is a 
stronger form of remedy than a declaration of incompatibility. However, an interpretive duty can in 
fact have a stronger remedial impact on an individual plaintiff (as well as on other, similarly situated 
individuals) than a mere declaration, since it does not require any additional measures by another 
branch of government to draft a new law – it immediately renders the existing law rights-compliant, 
and depending on how it is used, it may approach the point of blurring the lines between 
interpretation and amendment.185 
Courts can go one step further by directly invalidating a law. For example, in Liechtenstein, 
the Constitutional Court found that a law imposing an age limit of 16 for family reunification 
pertaining to children of third-state foreigners was unconstitutional. The effect of this decision was 
to allow all children of citizens of third countries to be granted reunification with their families up to 
the age of 18.186 Another example can be seen in Romania, where the Constitutional Court struck 
 
183 Hartz IV case, 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 3/09, 1 BvL 4/09, February 9, 2010, discussed in Nolan, supra n 39 at 251-2. 
184 Section 3(1). See, e.g., Hand and Anor v George [2017] EWHC 533 (in which the Adoption of Children Act 
1926, which excluded adopted children from being considered as ‘children’ for the purposes of testamentary 
dispositions of property, was ‘read down’ using section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to uphold the 
claimant’s right not to be discriminated against under Articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR).  For a discussion of how 
section 3(1) can be used to prioritise children’s rights, see Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child 
and the Human Rights Act’, (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 889. 
185 See, e.g., In re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10; [2002] 2 AC 291, in 
which an application of section 3(1) by the Court of Appeal to the implementation of child care orders under 
the Children Act 1989 was subsequently overturned by the House of Lords on the basis that it was a judicial 
innovation passing well beyond the boundary of interpretation. On the duty under section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, see Kavanagh, supra n 160 at 1018, who argues that ‘whatever else we may say about it, it 
seems inapt to describe it as weak. As interpreted by the higher courts in the UK, it has been understood as a 
‘strong adjuration’ to render legislation compatible with Convention rights even if it goes against the 
unambiguous wording and clear intention of the statute … Indeed, it is precisely because of its strength that 
the judicial use of § 3 has been accused of being indistinguishable from legislative amendment.’ Kavanagh 
observes at 1037 that Parliament has never overruled or modified a section 3 interpretation, ‘even in cases 
where there is evidence of considerable political disgruntlement about the judicial decision.’ 




down a law that made the payment of universal child benefit conditional upon attendance at a 
minimum level of compulsory schooling.187 
Invalidating a law is an effective remedy where the violation complained of is a function of 
law; however, it will clearly be irrelevant where the issue is solely one of policy and there is no law to 
point to. This is particularly relevant in the sphere of resource allocation and socio-economic rights, 
where the problem may well be attributable to executive inaction rather than to any particular 
action on the part of a branch of government. Declaratory relief (as discussed above) is one way of 
drawing attention to a rights violation of this nature; indeed, for separation of powers reasons, it will 
often be the preferred way. However, should declaratory relief not be responded to, the only option 
remaining to a court is to issue an injunction compelling a government agency to take specified steps 
to remedy the rights violation in question. The Irish courts experimented with mandatory injunctions 
in a number of cases concerning the constitutional rights of children with severe behavioural 
disorders who were a danger to themselves and others, and required integrated secure 
accommodation and educational facilities.188 However, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 
orders granted were a breach of the separation of powers and therefore an impermissible invasion 
into the sphere of the executive branch.189 In any system of government where the separation of 
powers plays a significant role, mandatory orders will be a problematic form of remedy; 
nonetheless, the South African Constitutional Court has developed a methodology for the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights that includes the possibility of mandatory injunctions, 
including in cases involving children’s rights.190 
In summary, the Enforceability spectrum displays an extremely wide range of mechanisms 
that are potentially available to remedy violations of children’s constitutional rights. It is not possible 
at this stage of research to present comprehensive findings on the state of the enforceability of 
children’s constitutional rights across Europe; the conclusions on this spectrum are more preliminary 
in nature. What can be said is that there is something of an inverse relationship between the 
accessibility of a remedy and its potential strength and effectiveness. The strongest remedies, like 
invalidating legislation and mandatory injunctions, involve overcoming expensive, time-consuming 
litigation as well as a general judicial reluctance to grant such far-reaching remedies. The more 
accessible remedies, like children’s ombudspersons, tend to have more limited powers. Ideally, 
there is a place for both – the accessibility of weaker remedies make them an essential way of 
addressing lower-level violations, while stronger judicial remedies provide a way of overcoming 
more intractable problems. Moreover, since one of the key benefits of constitutionalising children’s 
rights is to elevate them to a higher status than conflicting lower laws, it is important that the 
possibility exists of courts resolving such conflicts in favour of children’s constitutional rights, lest the 
benefits of constitutional status be limited to mere symbolism. Thus, while Point 2 should not be 
dispensed with, a constitution that additionally benefits from the remedies discussed under Points 3 




187 Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Romania to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/ROM/4, 
18 November 2008 at paras 604-605. 
188 DB v Minister for Justice [1999] 1 ILRM 93 and TD v Minister for Education [2000] 3 IR 62.  
189 TD v Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259. See O’Mahony, supra n 58 at paras 8-22 to 8-105. 
190 See, e.g., Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, Case CCT 8/02, Judgment of 5 July 2002, as 




As outlined in Part 2, the text of the CRC and the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee present a 
holistic vision of children’s rights which emphasises the importance of granting children enforceable 
legal rights in manner that develops their capacity to claim their rights as autonomous individuals. 
The Convention does not require states parties to include provisions on children’s rights in their 
national constitutions, but the Committee welcomes such inclusion where it occurs. The analysis in 
this paper has shown that within the Council of Europe, almost every state has included at least 
some reference to children or children’s rights in its national constitution; however, the quality of 
such provisions varies widely (see Figure 1 below). The spectrum analysis conducted in Parts 2, 3 and 
4 provides a framework that can be used to assess the quality of a particular scheme with a view to 
establishing the extent to which it is in harmony with the child rights approach envisaged by the CRC 
and the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee. It argues that constitutional provisions on children’s 
rights should, if they are to achieve harmony with this approach, have a certain combination of 
characteristics: high Visibility of children in the constitutional scheme, high levels of Agency 
attributed to children as rights-holders, and high levels of Enforceability in the event that rights are 
not vindicated by government institutions and agencies. 
All three spectrums have an important role to play, as they address different aspects of a 
child rights approach. Visibility addresses the need to keep children’s rights to the fore in 
adjudication, legislative processes and policy formation. Agency addresses the importance of doing 
this in a way that genuinely concerns children’s rights, as opposed to a paternalistic approach that 
focuses exclusively or predominantly on protecting children, to the exclusion or diminution of 
affording them autonomy and the capacity to influence their own lives. However, of the three 
spectrums, the key to unlocking the full potential of constitutional provisions on children’s rights is 
Enforceability. Where remedies for violating constitutional rights are either absent or very weak, the 
constitutional rights of children are reduced to little more than symbols. Symbolism is not entirely 
without value in constitutional law, but that value is decidedly limited, and is certainly far more 
limited than the value of rights which carry effective remedies for their enforcement. Thus, while 
some of the most impressive constitutional schemes on paper are those listed in Part 4 above that 
score highly on both Visibility and Agency, the value of those schemes in practice is strongly linked to 
how well they score on Enforceability At the same time, since access to justice is often a significant 
problem for children, Enforceability presents one of the biggest challenges in the field of children’s 
constitutional rights. The South African Constitution provides a particularly progressive model of 
how this challenge might be addressed.191 
Indeed, South Africa offers the clearest example internationally of a constitution that scores 
highly on all three spectrums. Within the Council of Europe, quite a few countries score highly on 
two of the three spectrums, but few, if any, score consistently highly across all three. Poland would 
have come close at one point; but, as noted in Part 5 above, the Polish Constitutional Court has 
retained a somewhat paternalistic mind-set, and the power to invalidate legislation has been 
undermined by recent regressive measures aimed at curbing the influence of the Constitutional 
 
191 Section 28(1)(h) of the South African Constitution recognises a right ‘to have a legal practitioner assigned to 
the child by the state and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would 
otherwise result’. See further Bonthuys, ‘The Best Interests of the Child in the South African Constitution’, 
(2006) 20 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23 at 32-3. 
191 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) at para 18. 
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Court.192 Romania also scores quite well, displaying high Visibility, a mixed approach to Agency that 
has been predominantly interpreted in a child-centred way by the courts, and a range of remedies 
that includes accessible administrative remedies as well as strong judicial remedies (including 
striking down legislation). But probably no European country can be situated at the highest point of 
all three spectrums. 
This paper does not claim that constitutions that score highly on the three spectrums 
correlate with a strong level of protection of children’s rights in practice – such a claim could not be 
made without the benefit of an enormous amount of empirical research which would go far beyond 
the scope of this study. Moreover, examples have been quoted above of countries in which 
constitutions that contain children’s rights provisions that look good on paper do not correlate with 
strong protection for those rights in practice.193 The argument of this paper is focused not on the 
actual level of rights protection on the ground, but on the degree of harmony with the child-rights 
approach envisaged by the CRC that constitutional schemes achieve. A state whose constitution 
meets the criteria set out above might not necessarily be the most CRC-compliant state on the 
whole; but it will be the state whose constitution best reflects the child rights approach envisaged by 
the Convention. 
Finally, it should be noted that the potential of constitutional provisions cannot be realised 
without being accompanied by a culture shift among political and legal actors, so that they are 
committed to upholding and enforcing children’s rights provisions and judgments. This is not 
something that can happen overnight. Experience in South Africa demonstrates how judges can, 
over time, become more comfortable with a child rights approach and make more effective use of 
constitutional provisions;194 but also how the potential of provisions will remain dormant until that 
point is reached.195 Thus, giving constitutional status to children’s rights should be seen as a starting 
point rather than an end in itself, and even constitutions that score highly on all three spectrums 
need to be accompanied by measures that will encourage courts and other government institutions 
to embrace them and place them at the heart of law-making, policy and adjudication. 
 
 
192 See, e.g., Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘Farewell to the Polish Constitutional Court’, VerfassungsBlog, 9 July, 2016, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/farewell-to-the-polish-constitutional-court/ [last accessed 8 April 2019], DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20160710-100611. 
193 See text accompanying n 152-154 supra. 
194 Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse, supra n 25. 
195 Sloth-Nielsen, ‘Children's rights in the South African courts: An overview since ratification of 





Figure 1: Selected Council of Europe member states situated on the three spectrums. 
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